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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CAROLYN HERBERT McCARVEL, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
BLAKE T. HERBERT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 950552-CA 
Oral Argument Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final decree in a domestic relations 
matter. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Are the trial court's findings deficient where the trial 
court failed to make any finding on the critical disputed issues 
and failed to explain the reason for denying Husband's defenses? 
This is an original issue presented to this Court. Although the 
issues presented in this appeal involve discretionary rulings by 
the trial court, the trial court is still required to make findings 
on all material issues sufficient to show that the decree "follows 
logically from, and is supported by, the evidence." Butler, 
Crockett & Walsh Development Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating 
Co., 909 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining 
that Wife was not estopped from seeking one-half of the current 
equity in the home, where it was undisputed that the parties had 
agreed to some modification of the divorce decree, Husband made 
improvements to the home in reliance upon his understanding that 
Wife did not claim any of the increased equity, and Wife did not 
respond to letters which confirmed that belief? This issue is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Trolley Square Assocs. v. 
Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). This issue was 
raised in Husband's answer (R. 61 f 9) and in Husband's trial 
memorandum. (R. 134-130.l) 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining 
that Wife's claims were not barred by laches, where Wife waited 
over five years before bringing her claim for part of the equity in 
the home and where Husband had made improvements to the home in 
reliance on his understanding, which had been clearly communicated 
to Wife, that he would only be obligated to pay the remaining 
balance of the $10,000.00 provided in the decree of divorce? This 
issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Papanikolas Brothers 
Enterprises v. Suqarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 
1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). This issue was raised below in Husband's 
answer (R. 61, f 9), and in Husband's trial memorandum (R. 127-
126) . 
lThe papers in the trial court file are organized in reverse 
chronological order, with the result that the record index numbers 
for any particular document run in reverse order. 
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4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering the 
home equity split as of the time of sale or appraisal, where that 
unfairly allowed Wife to profit from her own inaction? The trial 
court's adjustment of the parties' property interests is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion. Watson v. Watson, 837 P. 2d 1, 5 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) (citation omitted). This issue was raised below in 
Husband's trial memorandum. (R. 125-123.) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Husband is not aware of any constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. This is an appeal from a final 
decree which amended a prior decree in a domestic relations case. 
Only the division of property was at issue. 
B. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below. The parties 
were divorced by decree entered October 21, 1987. (R. 53-51.) On 
September 20, 1994, Wife filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause, 
which sought to enforce a provision in the divorce decree requiring 
Husband to pay a portion of the home equity to Wife. (R. 54.) The 
trial court issued the requested order to show cause. (R. 59-58.) 
Husband responded to the order to show cause and asserted, among 
other things, that Wife's claims were barred by laches, promissory 
estoppel and the statute of limitations. (R. 62-60.) 
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A hearing on the order to show cause was held before Judge 
Steven L. Hansen on October 27, 1994. (R. 68-67.) Judge Hansen 
ordered the matter set for a trial before a district court judge. 
(Id.) The case was assigned to Judge Ray M. Harding and set for 
trial on April 17, 1995. (R. 69.) Following trial, the court 
entered its memorandum decision finding the issues in favor of 
Wife. (R. 144-143.) The court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 148-146) and its Order Amending Decree of 
Divorce (R. 151-149) on August 15, 1995. Husband filed his notice 
of appeal on September 13, 1995. (R. 155-154.) 
On October 26, 1995, Wife filed a motion for extension of time 
to file a notice of cross-appeal. (R. 159-158.) On November 30, 
1995, the trial court granted that motion by memorandum decision 
(R. 170-169) , and also signed an Order for Extension of Time to 
Submit Cross-Appeal which had been submitted to the court by Wife 
prior to the court's ruling, and which stated that Wife had ten 
days to file her notice of cross-appeal. (R. 172-171.) Thereafter, 
on December 21, 1995, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law on the extension of time issues (R. 174-
173), and a second Order. (R. 176-175.) This second Order did not 
specify when the notice of appeal should be filed.2 Wife filed her 
notice of cross-appeal on January 8, 1996. 
2
 Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides 
that the maximum extension of time which may be granted by a trial 
court is "10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the 
motion." 
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C Statement Of Facts. The parties were divorced by a 
decree entered September 27, 1987. (R. 53-51.) Two provisions of 
the divorce decree give rise to the dispute presently before the 
Court: 
3. Each party is hereby ordered to pay 
their own debts and Plaintiff is to take 
Defendant's name off any credit cards she is 
using. 
5. Defendant is ordered to pay 
Plaintiff her equity in the home, namely, Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) within eighteen 
(18) months, namely, March 1989. In the event 
such amount is not paid, the parties are to 
sell the home and the net equity is to be 
divided between the parties. Each party is to 
sign appropriate documents to sell the home 
and each party agrees to fully cooperate in 
the selling of such home. 
On May 16, 1989, Wife's attorney sent a letter to Husband's 
attorney asserting that Husband had failed to make the home equity 
payment required by the divorce decree. (R. 119-118.) Wife 
thereafter had a telephone conversation with Husband regarding the 
foregoing provisions of the divorce decree. (R. 193.) At that 
time, Wife had not complied with her obligation to take Husband's 
name off the credit cards and to pay the credit cards (R. 23 0-231, 
195-196), nor had Husband paid the $10,000.00. (R. 193, 220.) 
During the telephone conversation, according to Husband, he 
offered to pay the credit card bills for Wife, with the amount of 
the credit card payments to be offset against the $10,000.00 equity 
payment, and she agreed to accept the offset and to allow Husband 
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to pay the balance of the $10,000.00 equity payment to her after he 
finished paying off the credit cards. (R. 220, 228-29.) Wife 
admitted the conversation occurred, but asserted that she only 
agreed to allow the offset against whatever equity payment she was 
entitled to, i.e, not limited to $10,000.00. (R. 193, 209.) 
On June 5, 1989, apparently following the conversation between 
Wife and Husband, Husband sent a letter to his attorney asserting 
that the home equity issue had been resolved. (R. 116.) Husband's 
attorney, in turn, sent a letter to Wife's attorney which stated: 
I am informed by Mr. Herbert that he has 
contacted his ex-Wife directly and satisfied 
the problems in regard to the demands that you 
made in your recent letter to me. If your 
understanding is different from this, please 
let me know. 
(R. 114.) No response was made to that letter. (R. 230.) Over 
three years later, on July 21, 1992, Wife sent a letter to Husband 
claiming that she was entitled to $25,000.00 as her share of the 
equity in the house. (R. 73.) Husband responded, through his 
attorney, by reminding Wife of the agreement made in 1989, and 
inviting Wife to discuss the matters with Husband's attorney. (R. 
71-70.) Again, Wife did not respond to the letter or make any 
further efforts to collect the claimed home equity payment, until 
she filed her order to show cause to commence the current 
proceeding. (R. 213-214.) 
Following the 1989 agreement, Husband made all of the payments 
on the credit cards. (R. 211.) The total of the payments was 
$6,077.04. (R. 110, 226.) The last payment on the credit cards 
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was made in November, 1994. (R. 229, 234.) Husband also made all 
of the mortgage payments for the house and made improvements to the 
home, including installation of a new furnace and air conditioning 
system (October 1992 or 1993), and installation of a new front door 
and new patio doors (just before trial in April, 1995). (R. 223.) 
Husband also prepared the home for landscaping. (R. 231.) The 
cost of the improvements was approximately $6,000.00. (Id.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should hold as a matter of law that Wife is 
estopped from asserting her claims. Husband, through counsel, sent 
letters to Wife setting forth Husband's understanding of the 
agreement between the parties. Wife failed to respond to the 
letters. Based on his belief that his debt to Wife was only 
$10,000.00 less credit card payments, Husband made improvements to 
the home and failed to make other arrangements to pay the debt 
prior to further appreciation of the value of the home. Wife's 
inaction should be held to create an estoppel or to bar her claims 
on the grounds of laches. 
At a minimum, the Court should remand with directions that the 
equity be determined as of July, 1992. On that date, Husband's 
counsel sent a letter to Wife clearly communicating that Husband 
believed his only obligation was to pay $10,000.00 less credit card 
payments. Wife did not respond, and following that date, Husband 
7 
invested at least $6,000.00 in improvements to the home. Also, the 
house continued to appreciate in value. 
If this Court does not direct judgment in favor of Husband, 
the case should be remanded for additional findings. The trial 
court is required to make findings on all material issues in order 
to permit appellate review. The trial court found that the parties 
had reached an oral agreement in May, 1989, to modify the payment 
requirements of the divorce decree, but failed to make needed 
findings concerning the terms of that agreement. The court further 
failed to make any findings to support its denial of Husband's 
equitable defenses of laches and estoppel. Remand of this case is 
required to permit the trial court to make the required findings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE DECISION. 
The need for detailed findings of fact has been repeatedly 
emphasized by the Utah appellate courts: 
Failure of the trial court to make 
findings on all material issues is reversible 
error unless the facts in the record are 
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment." The findings of fact must show 
that the court's judgment or decree "follows 
logically from, and is supported by, the 
evidence." The findings "should be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
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which the ultimate conclusion on each factual 
issue was reached." 
Butler. Crockett & Welsh Development Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline 
Operating Co., 909 P.2d 223, 231 (Utah 1995) (quoting Acton v. J. 
B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). 
The trial court failed to resolve the disputed factual issues 
in this case. The parties agreed that they had a telephone 
conversation in May or June, 1989, resulting in an agreement that 
Husband was going to pay the credit card payments and that those 
payments were to be deducted from whatever he owed Wife. The 
parties disagreed, however, on several important issues. Husband's 
recollection, confirmed in a letter to which Wife did not respond, 
was that the credit card payments were to be deducted from the 
$10,000.00 home equity amount, and that the balance was to be paid 
after the credit card payments were finished. Wife at trial 
asserted disagreement as to both the amount of the home equity and 
the time for payment. 
Resolution of that disputed issue was critical. If the 
Husband's version was accurate, it is difficult to see how the 
trial court's decision could be sustained. If the Wife's 
recollection of the initial agreement was accurate, the trial court 
should have specifically considered the effect of her failure to 
respond to the letters from Husband's attorney on the subject. 
The trial court also failed to state its reasons for denying 
Husband's claims of estoppel, laches and waiver. The trial court's 
memorandum decision does not even address those issues. The 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by Wife's counsel 
state only: "The court having reviewed the trial memorandum of the 
Defendant and having considered Defendant's argument for estoppel, 
waiver, equitable doctrine of laches, and valuation of the 
property, denied the same." This cursory finding is insufficient. 
Husband argues below that the evidence compels a determination 
in his favor. At a minimum, however, the matter should be remanded 
to the trial court for entry of findings on the disputed issues, in 
order to permit appropriate appellate review. 
POINT II 
WIFE IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING HALF OF THE 
APPRECIATED VALUE OF THE HOME. 
This Court outlined the elements of estoppel as follows: 
Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which 
precludes parties from asserting their rights 
where their actions render it inequitable to 
allow them to assert those rights. Estoppel 
requires proof of three elements: (1) a 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act 
by one party inconsistent with a later-
asserted claim; (2) the other party's 
reasonable action or inaction based on the 
first party's statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act; and (3) injury to the second 
party that would result from allowing the 
first party to contradict or repudiate its 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
State ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 893 P.2d 1107 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
Each of these elements was satisfied in this case. Although 
Wife did not recall receiving some of the letters (R. 212-213), 
there was no real dispute that Husband had clearly communicated to 
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Wife or to her attorney that the issues regarding payment for the 
home equity had been resolved, and that the total payments Husband 
would be required to make would be $10, 000. 00.3 Also undisputed is 
that Wife failed to take any effective action to controvert the 
clear understanding expressed in Husband's statements. Finally, 
there was injury to Husband from the inaction. Based on his 
assumption that he and Wife had agreed that he would only pay 
$10,000.00 less the credit card payments, he continued making 
improvements to the home and, more importantly, made no efforts to 
obtain a loan to satisfy the debt to Wife before the property 
values increased further. 
Even if the initial agreement was as now asserted by Wife, 
Wife still had a duty to respond and refute the claims in the 
letters from Husband's counsel. The house was apparently 
appreciating rapidly in value. Where Wife knew that Husband 
believed that his only debt to Wife was $10,000.00 less the credit 
card payments, it was inequitable to allow her to sit idly by and 
allow the house to appreciate and to then claim half of the 
appreciated value of the house. The trial court abused its 
discretion by disregarding Husband's claims of estoppel. 
POINT III 
WIFE'S CLAIMS WERE BARRED BY LACHES. 
Husband's obligation to pay Wife a portion of the equity 
matured in March, 1989. Wife did not seek court assistance in 
3
 Husband would be willing to pay interest on the $10,000.00. 
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enforcing that claim for five and one-half years. Wife made one 
demand, in May 1989, for payment of the equity, which was promptly 
met by Husband negotiating with her for payment of the credit card 
debt. The only other attempt was her letter in July, 1992, which 
actually compounded her inaction because she failed to respond to 
the letter from Husband's counsel asserting that Husband's total 
obligation was $10,000.00, and thereby reinforced Husband's belief 
concerning the agreement in 1989. Under these circumstances, the 
trial court should have held the claims barred by laches. Laches 
has been defined as follows: 
Laches is not mere delay, but delay that 
works a disadvantage to another. To 
constitute laches, two elements must be 
established: (1) The lack of diligence on the 
part of plaintiff; (2) An injury to defendant 
owing to such lack of diligence. Although 
lapse of time is an essential part of laches, 
the length of time must depend upon the 
circumstances of each case, for the propriety 
of refusing a claim is equally predicated upon 
the gravity of the prejudice suffered by 
defendant and the length of plaintiff's delay. 
Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Suaarhouse Shopping Center 
Associates. 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). 
Husband satisfies these elements. There was obviously a lack 
of diligence by Wife. Her excuses for her lack of diligence were 
feelings of guilt4 and her non-pushy personalty. (R. 202.) Wife 
offered no other evidence to controvert the claim of laches. While 
persons are certainly not required to be litigious, Wife should 
4She did not explain why she felt guilty for seeking more than 
$10,000 in home equity. 
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have, at a minimum, responded to the July, 1992, letter from 
Husband's attorney. 
The trial court apparently based its determination on the fact 
that, had Husband paid the $10,000.00 to Wife in March, 1989, Wife 
could have paid the credit card debts. That may be true, but it is 
really irrelevant to the issue of whether Wife was guilty of 
laches. There is no evidence that Husband had the ability to pay 
$10,000.00 in March, 1989. From the minimal payments he made on 
the high-interest credit card obligations, one would assume that he 
did not have an ability to make that payment. More importantly, if 
the agreement was as Husband understood it to be, he had no reason 
to make the payment. Husband's understanding of the agreement was 
that the balance of $10,000.00 was not due until he had finished 
paying on the credit cards. Had Wife not been sitting on her 
rights, Husband likely would have taken different actions. He 
would not, for example, have contributed $6,000.00 to improvements 
on the house. By delaying to take any action when she reasonably 
should have known that Husband believed that his total obligation 
was $10,000.00, Wife has been guilty of laches. This Court should 
remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to dismiss 
Wife's claims on the grounds of laches. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE HOME 
TO BE VALUED AT THE TIME OF THE HEARING. 
The trial court's order grants Wife the full benefit of all 
appreciation in the home, by ordering that the home be sold or 
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appraised, and that she receive half of the equity at the time of 
sale or appraisal, less certain specified offsets for the Husband's 
credit card payments and mortgage payments. This unfairly rewards 
Wife for her inaction. Husband argued in his trial memorandum that 
the equity in the home should be split as of March, 1989. Such a 
ruling would be appropriate based on the agreement between the 
parties. At a minimum, however, the Court should order that the 
equity be determined as of July, 1992. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that the parties 
made an oral agreement to modify certain payment requirements 
specified in their decree of divorce. Husband believed the 
agreement to be that his total debt was $10,000.00 less the credit 
card payments, and it is undisputed that Wife knew or should have 
known that such was Husband's belief, at least by July, 1992. This 
Court should hold that Wife's claim for one-half of the current 
equity is barred by her laches, or that she is estopped from 
asserting the claim by her failure to respond to the letters from 
Husband's attorney. Alternatively, the Court should remand this 
matter for adequate findings on the disputed issues. 
DATED this 22nd day of March, 1996. 
~ - ^ ~ ^ ^ ^ 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: /J 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN-7 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 22nd 
day of March, 1996. 
Dana D. Burrows, Esq. 
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APPENDK "A" 
Decree of Divorce (R. 53-51) 
' - ' » ; ? / = , , . ' 
RONALD R. STANGER #3074 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
80 East 100 North 
P. 0. Box 477 
Provo, Utah 84603 
(801) 375-5010 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN HERBERT, 
P l a i n t i f f , /DECREE OF DIVORCE • " 
v s . 
BLAKE T. HERBERT, 
Defendant. Civil No. CV 87 264 
/ 
The above-enti t led matter, having come on regular ly for 
hear ing before the Court on the 21st day of September, 1987 
before the Honorable Ray M. Harding. P la in t i f f was present and 
represen ted by Ronald R. S tanger , Derendant was p resen t and 
represen ted by Don R. Pe t e r s en . P l a i n t i f f moved for an Order 
amending the grounds in paragraph 4 of the Complaint to a l lege 
i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r ences as grounds for such d ivo rce . The 
Court granted such motion. The Court also heard a St ipula t ion 
en te red in to between the p a r t i e s and the Court approved such 
S t i p u l a t i o n . The Court having heard evidence and having 
considered the s t i p u l a t i o n entered in to by the p a r t i e s and 
1 000 053 
having made in writing its Findings of Fact ana Conclusions of 
Law and being fully advised in the premises; 
NOW HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce 
from and against the Defendant, the same to become final upon 
the signing and entry in the Registry of Actions. 
2. No alimony is to be awarded. 
3. Each party is hereby ordered to pay their own debts 
ana Plaintiff is to take Defendant's name off of any credit 
cards she is using. 
4. Each party is awarded the life insurance policy 
presently in their respective names. 
5. Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff her equity in 
the home, namely, Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) within 
eighteen (18) months, namely, March 1989. In the event such 
amount is not paid, the parties are to sell the home and the 
net equity is to be divided between the parties. Each party is 
to sign appropriate documents to sell the home and each party 
agrees to fully cooperate in the selling of such home. 
6. Plaintiff is to be awarded the following items of 
personal property: 
1974 Ford Torino Elite 
Gray couch purchased in 1986 
Sewing machine 
Cedar chest 
2 000 
Persona l p i c t u r e s 
Clothing 
China 
7. Each p a r t y i s o r d e r e d to pay t h e i r own a t t o r n e y 
fees and cos t s incurred in t h i s raatter. 
DATED th : 
1987. 
icurrec- in c m s u a t c e r . 
i is 'QJ*-£'_ day o f £ / & r £ * ~ ~ ~ ' 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BY THE-TOUR 
DON R. PETERSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I I I I H I ' • • ' • II • I I 1 ^ 1 I I I • • • I II 
Delivered a copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce in 
a n ^ e n v e l o p e , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , t h i s __j£j?r_L_ d a v o f 
jptfAlh , 1987 t o t h e o f f i c e of Don R. P e t e r s e n , 
A t t o r n e y fo r Defendan t , 120 Eas t 300 Nor th , P. 0. Box 778, 
Provo, UT 84603. 
~^ Sec re ta ry 

APPENDIX "B" 
Memorandum Decision (R. 144-143) 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, Stets of Utah 
CARMA Bj/SMITH, Clerk 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN HERBERT McCARVEL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLAKE T. HERBERT, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 87 264 
DATE: May 12, 1995 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court for ruling after hearing held in this matter on April 
17, 1995. Having received and considered the testimony and evidence presented in this 
matter, the Court finds as follows: 
The parties were divorced in 1987. Pursuant to the divorce decree entered in this 
matter, each party was to "pay their own debts and Plaintiff is to take Defendant's name off of 
any credit card she is using." Also, Defendant was ordered to "pay Plaintiff her equity in the 
home, namely, Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) within eighteen months, namely March, 1989. 
In the event such amount is not paid, the parties are to sell the home and the net equity is to 
be divided between the parties." 
By May of 1989, Plaintiff had not paid off the credit cards, nor had Defendant paid 
Plaintiff the $10,000. 
Both parties admit that the decree was modified by them in May of 1989 in that they 
agreed that Defendant would pay off the credit card debt for Plaintiff although they disagree 
whether this payment would be offset against the $10,000 as Defendant suggests, or against 
what "he owed her," according to Plaintiff. 
The Court finds that had Defendant paid Plaintiff her $10,000 equity in the home by 
March of 1989, Plaintiff could likely have paid her credit cards. By delaying the payment of 
000 144 
the $10,000 equity, Defendant has caused his own undoing. Defendant had the use of the 
premises, and the benefit of retaining the use of the $10,000, while only making payments on 
the high interest credit cards, which would require the equivalent of her paying the interest on 
the debt since 1987. Yet Defendant desires to hold Plaintiff to a non-inflationary total 
amount while receiving the benefit himself of the rise in land values. 
Therefore, the Court finds in equity that Plaintiff is entitled to have the home sold and 
the net equity divided between the parties. Defendant may however, take an offset before 
division of the equity, for mortgage payments he has made since entry of the decree, as well 
as a credit of $6,000 for improvements he has made to the property. After an equal division 
of the remaining equity, Defendant may take an additional offset in the amount of $6,077.04, 
the amount of credit card payments he made. 
Should Defendant desire to buy out Plaintiffs equity in the home rather than having it 
sold he has that right. To do so, the property must be appraised by a mutually agreed upon 
appraiser, if the parties cannot agree on an appraiser, the Court will appoint one. Defendant 
must then exercise his right to buy out Plaintiffs interest in the equity of the home within 60 
days of that appraisal. 
Each party shall bear their own attorney's fees in this matter. 
Counsel for Plaintiff is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision consistent 
with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form 
prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no effect until 
such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 12th day of May, 1995. 
cc: Don R. Petersen, Esq. 
Dana D. Burrows, Esq. 
r\ * r\ 
APPENDIX "C 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 148-145) 
DANA D. BURROWS - 5045 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
387 West Center 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 222-9700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN HERBERT (McCARVEL) : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
BLAKE T. HERBERT, : 
Civil No. 87 264 
Defendant. : Judge Ray M. Harding 
The above-entitled matiter having come before the Court for 
trial on issues certified to Judge Harding on April 17, 1995. 
Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel Dana D. Burrows. 
Defendant was present and represented by counsel Don K Petersen. 
The Court having entertained the argument of counsel and testimony 
of the parties as well as affidavits of attorneysf fees and 
memorandum i egai di ng property settlement dnd being fully advised 
the premises, and having issued a Memorandum Decision dated May 12, 
1995, now, therefore, the Court now enters its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions .nv: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were divorced in 1987. 
— • 2. Pursuant in the Divorce Decree eat ei:ed in tint; niat.ter, 
each party was to pay their own debts and Plaintiff was to take 
Defendants name off of any credit card she used. Also, Defendant 
7 yj n U SC \ sj 3 « U 
1 
000 
was ordered to pay Plaintiff her equity in the home in the amount 
of $10,000 within eighteen months, namely by March 1989. In the 
event such amount was not paid, the parties were ordered to sell 
the home and the net equity divided between the parties. 
3. By May of 1989, Plaintiff had not paid off the credit 
cards nor had Defendant paid Plaintiff the $10,000. 
4. The Decree of Divorce was modified by the parties in May 
of 1989 in that they agreed that Defendant would pay off the credit 
card debt for Plaintiff although they disagree whether this payment 
would be offset against the $10,000 as Defendant suggests, or 
against what Plaintiff alleges Defendant owed her. 
5. The Court having reviewed the trial memorandum of the 
Defendant and having considered Defendant's argument for estoppel, 
waiver, equitable doctrine of laches, and valuation of the 
property, denied the same. 
6. The Court finds that had Defendant paid Plaintiff her 
$10,000 equity in the home by March of 1989, Plaintiff could likely 
have paid her credit cards. By delaying the payment of the $10,000 
equity, Defendant has caused his own undoing. Defendant had the 
use of the premises and the benefit of retaining the use of the 
$10,000 while only making payments on the high interest credit 
cards, which would require the equivalent of her payment the 
interest on the debt since 1987. Yet Defendant desires to hold 
Plaintiff to a non-inflationary total amount while receiving the 
benefit himself of the rise in land values. 
7. Therefore, the Court finds in equity that Plaintiff is 
2 000 
entitled tc have the home sold and the net equity divided between 
the parties. Defendant may, however, take an offset, before 
division of the equity, for mortgage payments he has made since 
entry ol the decree as well as a credit of $6,000 for improvements 
he has made to the property. After an equal division of the 
remaining equity, Defendant may take an additional offset in the 
amount of $6,07 7 ,.04, the amount of credit card payments made 
8. Should Defendant desire to buy out Plaintiff f s equity in 
the home rather than having it sold, he has that right. To do so, 
the property must be appraised by a mutually agreed upon appraiser. 
If the parties cannot agree on an appraiser, the Court will appoint 
one. Defendant must then exercise his right to buy out Plaintiff's 
interest in the equity of the home within 60 days of that 
appraisal. 
9 , < - - responsi bJ e for thed i: own attorney,! s 
fees in this matter. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Coin: t has jurisdiction over the pa rti es :i i:i the 
above-entitled matter. 
2. All remaining provisions of the Findings of Fact are 
hereby incorporated :i nto the Conclusions of Law. 
DATED this /4^ day of ^^^r^95. 
JUDBETRAY M. HARDING
 ( ^— 
Disp~ict Court Judge \ / 
3 000 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM 
Don Petersen 
Attorney for Defendant 
4-504 MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the/foregoing 
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this O ^ day of 
July, 1995. 
Don R. Petersen 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, UT 84603 
DANA D. BURROWS 
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APPENDIX "D" 
Order Amending Decree of Divorce (R. 151-149) 
DANA D. BURROWS - 5045 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
387 West Center 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 222-9700 
tftftf 0& 
% • 
v ^^G!5 mi*:* 
u 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN HERBERT (McCARVEL) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLAKE T. HERBERT, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AMENDING DECREE OF 
DIVORCE 
Civil No. 87 264 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court for 
trial issues certified Judge Harding on April 17, 1995. 
Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel Dana D. Burrows. 
Defendant was present and represented by counsel Don R. Petersen. 
The '"curt having entei tained the argument of counsel and testimony 
of the parties as well as affidavits of attorneys' fees and 
memorandum regarding property settlement and being fully advised in 
the premises, am I having issued a Memorandum Decision dated May 12, 
1995, and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1 Pla Intiff is entitled tc: • h a v e the home sol ci and the net 
equity divided between the parties. Defendant may, however, take 
an offset, before division of the equity, for mortgage payments he 
has made since entry of the decree as well as a credit of $6,000 
for improvements he has made to the property. After an equal 
000 
division of the remaining equity, Defendant may take an additional 
offset in the amount of $6,077.04, the amount of credit card 
payments made. 
2. Should Defendant desire to buy out Plaintiff's equity in 
the home rather than having it sold, he has that right. To do so, 
the property must be appraised by a mutually agreed upon appraiser. 
If the parties cannot agree on an appraiser, the Court will appoint 
one. Defendant must then exercise his right to buy out Plaintiff's 
interest in the equity of the home within 60 days of that 
appraisal. 
Don Petersen 
Attorney for Defendant 
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4-504 MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this \~7h0 day of 
July, 1995. 
Don R. Petersen 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, UT 84603 
DANA D. BURROWS " 
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AK_JIX"E" 
Exhibit A, Letter dated May 16, 1989 
RONALD R. STANGER 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
UNITED SURETY BUILDING 
80 EAST 100 NORTH - P.O. BOX 477 
PROVO, UTAH 84603 
(801) 375-5010 
May 16, 1989 
Mr. Don R. Petersen 
Attorney at Law 
120 East 300 North 
P. 0. Box 778 
Provo, UT 84603 
RE 
?5*M 
MAY 1 81989 
Heroert vs. Herbert HOWARD. LEWIS PET; 
Dear Don: 
My c l i e n t , Caro lyn H e r b e r t , has b rough t t o 
paragraph 5 o f the Decree of D i v o r c e has not 
w i t h . Such paragraph reads as f o l l o w s : 
my a t t e n t i o n t h a t 
y e t been c o m p l l e d 
" 5 . D e f e n d a n t i s o r d e r e d t o pay 
P l a i n t i f f h e r e q u i t y i n t h e home , 
n a m e l y , T e n T h o u s a n d D o l l a r s 
( $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) w i t h i n e i g h t e e n ( 1 8 ) 
m o n t h s , n a m e l y , Ma rch 1989. < I n t h e 
e v e n t s u c h a m o u n t i s n o t p a i d , t h e 
p a r t i e s a re t o s e l l t h e home and t h e net 
e q u i t y i s t o be d i v i d e d b e t w e e n t h e 
p a r t i e s . E a c h p a r t y i s t o s i g n 
a p p r o p r i a t e d o c u m e n t s t o s e l l t h e home 
and each p a r t y agrees t o f u l l y coopera te 
i n the s e l l i n g of such home.1' 
Mr. He rbe r t has re fused t o comply w i t h such o r d e r . 
The p u r p o s e o f t h i s l e t t e r i s t o see i f we can a v o i d r u n n i n g 
up a d d i t i o n a l a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s and see i f you c o u l d check w i t h 
y o u r c l i e n t t o see i f he w o u l d be w i l l i n g t o c o m p l y w i t h o u t t h e 
n e c e s s i t y o f f u r t h e r l e g a l a c t i o n . 
I have been i n s t r u c t e a to f i l e an Order t o Show Cause I n Re: 
Contempt. I h e s i t a t e to do t h a t t h e r e f o r e , I thought i t wou ld 
be more p r o f e s s i o n a l t o w r i t e t o you d i r e c t l y t o see i f we can 
a s s i s t our c l i e n t s . 
I have c a l l e a you on t h e t e l e p h o n e and i t m i g h t be tha . t we 
have c h a t t e d about t h i s by the t i m e you get t h i s l e t t e r . 
000 
» , ; l l 
u i ; 1 1 Q 
Mr. Pe te rsen 
May 16, 1989 
Page Two 
I would a p p r e c i a t e i t i f you wou ld c a l l me a t your e a r l i e s t 
c o n v e n i e n c e . 
y,ery / t r u l y _ y o u r s , 
RRS:sw 
c c : Caro lyn H e r b e r t 
/ / R O N A L D R. STANGER 
' ^ A t t /o rney at Law 
ooo 
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APPENDIX "F" 
Exhibit B, Letter dated June 5, 1989 (R. 116) 
looted 
tGttaD 
JUN 0 81989 
H2WARD. LEWIS S PETERSEN 
r^<- //<f / 
C'/ri /?• fe&Z* £<£*>is^. 
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APPENDIX "G" 
Exhibit C, Letter dated June 12, 1989 (R. 114) 
Jackson Howard 
S. Rex Lewis 
Don R. Petersen 
Craig M. Snyder 
John L. Valentine 
D. David Lambert 
Fred D. Howard 
Leslie W. Siaugh 
Kevin J. Sutterfieid 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
Attorneys and Counselors at Law 
120 East 300 North Street 
Post Office Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
June 12, 1989 
Area Code 801 
Telephone 373-6345 
Teiefax 377-4991 
L:S t anger.sr 
Our File No. 18,060 
Mr. Ron Stanger 
Attorney at Law 
80 East 100 North 
P.O. Box 477 
Provo, UT 84603 
Re: Herbert v. Herbert 
Dear Ron: 
I am informed by Mr. Herbert that he has contacted his ex-wife directly and 
satisfied the problems in regards to the demands that you made in your recent letter 
to me. If your understanding is different from this, please let me know. 
Very truly yours, 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Don R. Petersen 
DRP/sdr 
cc: Mr. Blake Herbert 
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APPENDIX "H" 
Exhibit F, Letter dated July 31, 1992 (R. 71-70) 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
Post Office Box 778 
Jackson Ho ware Provo. Utah 84603 Kevin J. Sutterileid 
Don R. Petersen F. Richards Smith HI 
Craig M. Snvder Telephone: (301) 373-3345 Linda J. Barciav 
John L. Valentine Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 DanieUe M. Ferron 
D. David Lamoert _. 
FredD. Howard '* °" OF COUNSEL 
Leslie W. Slaugn S. Rex Lewis 
Dwignt Flickinger 
July 31, 1992 
Carolyn McCarvel 
1316 East Knollwood Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
Re: Carolyn McCarvel v. Blake Herbert 
Dear Mrs. McCarvel: 
Your letter of July 21, 1992 to Mr. Blake T. Herbert has been referred to our office. 
I have reviewed your letter, together with the Decree of Divorce, and I am informed that 
subsequent to the Decree of Divorce there was an agreement made. Mr. Herbert agreed to pay 
for credit card obligations which had been incurred by yourself. These were incurred by way 
of a Zions First National Bank VISA Card and a Zions First National Bank MasterCard. The 
agreement provided that Mr. Herbert would pay for these accounts, and the amounts that he 
paid would be subtracted from the 510,000.00. 
Your letter dated July 21st makes no reference to the agreement made with Mr. Herbert. 
I note in the file that I received a letter from Mr. Ronald Stanger, who was representing you 
at the time of the divorce, making demand for the 510,000. I was informed by Mr. Herbert 
in May of 1989 that an agreement had been made and I so informed Mr. Stanger by way of a 
letter dated June 12, 1989. I never heard anything further from him. 
Mr. Herbert wants to be responsible about this matter and he is willing to pay the 
510,000.00 after receiving a credit for payment of the credit card obligations, and credit for 
approximately S800.00 by way of checks that he paid directly to you. 
000 071 
Carolyn McCarvel 
July 31, 1992 
Page 2 
I would appreciate hearing from you, or if you are represented by an attorney, ^I^ie 
have your attorney contact me. Mr. Herbert is desirous to resolve this matter without the 
necessity of further costs and expenses involved. 
Very truly yours, 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
DRP:dlp 
cc: Blake T. Herbert 
Lmccarve!.Jtr 
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